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A Moderate Approach to 
Extreme Altruism.
by Brendan Terry 
In “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer advances a 
“Strong Principle” of moral action that has prodigious implications: 
“If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, 
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral impor-
tance, we ought, morally, to do it” (231). Singer’s Strong Principle 
is a hotly contested, influential topic in Utilitarian ethics.1 As Singer 
himself recognizes, “If [the Strong Principle] were acted upon, even 
in its qualified form, our lives, our society, and our world would be 
fundamentally changed” (231). 
The Strong Principle requires moral agents to be extremely altruistic. 
It is Singer’s theoretical keystone to the most radical practical realiza-
tion of his argument: affluent people (by global standards) have the 
duty to donate money to charities that effectively assist the world’s 
poor until they themselves are nearly as poor as the people whom 
they send money to help. The Strong Principle makes three main 
claims in support of such a duty. It explicitly stipulates that one’s ca-
pacity to help is proportionate to one’s moral responsibility to help, and 
it implicitly suggests that one’s duty to help others is not lessened by 
physical distance or whether one is among millions capable of provid-
ing assistance (231). 
Though I agree with these conclusions, I consider the Strong Princi-
ple to be based upon a deceptive predicating assumption, introduced 
at the start of Singer’s essay: that “suffering and death from lack of 
food, shelter, and medical care are bad” (231). In a previous paper, I 
demonstrated that this predicating assumption embeds in its charac-
terization of “bad” the moral imperative that Singer presents in the 
Strong Principle (from which he derives all of his conclusions). Thus, 
Singer assumes his own conclusions, or begs the question. This opens 
1 The essay has over two thousand citations to date.
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his argument to technical objections that undermine the philosophi-
cal grounds of his call to action. However, I contend that the Strong 
Principle is worthy of alternative supporting arguments because it 
radically conceives of extreme altruism as a moral obligation (Brock).2
To consider altruism in a moral sense, I must clarify what I judge to 
be moral concerns, or what I mean by “morality.” I agree with Ber-
nard and Joshua Gert, who argue that morality is an “informal public 
system that all rational persons, under certain specified conditions, 
would endorse.” An informal public system is a normative system that 
is knowable by and rational to follow for all to whom it applies; it 
also, roughly stated, does not involve an authority that definitively 
decides how it functions. While it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to give a detailed description of under which specified conditions 
rational agents must operate to agree upon a morality, a significant 
condition worth noting here is that all agents must be sufficiently 
informed (Gert).
I also consider the Strong Principle to be a moral rule, since it pro-
vides clear guidelines to evaluate our actions in relation to harms, 
and I am persuaded by Gert’s observation that “moral rules do seem 
to limit their content to behavior that directly or indirectly causes 
or risks harm to others.” The Strong Principle has a societal aim—to 
mitigate severe suffering—so it also conforms with the claim that 
“having a certain sort of social goal is definitional of morality” (Fran-
kena).
From the perspective of morality as an informal public system and 
the Strong Principle as a moral rule whose goal is to mitigate severe 
suffering, we can begin to analyze the Principle’s merits in a shared 
context. Consider it again: “if it is in our power to prevent something 
bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of compa-
rable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.” One could ob-
ject that the Strong Principle supposes allowing harm is very morally 
wrong, but one reasonably could believe only doing harm is very mor-
ally wrong (Woollard). Under this interpretation, the Strong Princi-
2  This is Gillian Brock’s characterization of the Strong Principle.
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ple’s position is generally cast as consequentialist—Singer is himself 
a consequentialist. As Fiona Woollard and Frances Howard-Snyder 
write, “consequentialists believe that doing harm is no worse than 
merely allowing harm while anti-consequentialists, almost universally, 
disagree.” 
However, I would argue that the Strong Principle does not explicit-
ly indicate that doing harm is equal to allowing harm. In “Famine, 
Affluence, and Morality,” Singer only suggests that allowing harm, in 
extreme circumstances, can be very morally wrong. Someone who ac-
cepts that allowing harm is even slightly morally wrong would likely 
accept that allowing extreme harm could be very morally wrong; for 
example, such a person, consequentialist or not, may believe that let-
ting someone die is generally very wrong. Indeed, because the severe 
suffering that Singer examines is tantamount to death, and since that 
suffering is quite practically preventable (through donation to cer-
tain charities, for instance), the aspect of the Strong Principle which 
claims that “allowing harm is morally wrong” seems tenable (“What 
Makes a Charity Effective?”).
Another objection to Singer’s Strong Principle is that it proposes too 
extreme a form of “obligatory beneficence” (Beauchamp).3 In “Fam-
ine, Affluence, and Morality,” Singer predicts such an objection, so he 
proposes an additional weak principle: “If it is in our power to pre-
vent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing 
anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it,” (emphasis 
added) which adheres to:
the more or less classic idea...that a person P has an obligation of benefi-
cence to help another whenever the other is at risk of significant loss of or 
damage to some basic interest; P’s action is necessary (singly or collabora-
tively) to prevent this loss or damage; P’s action (singly or collaboratively) 
is likely to prevent the loss or damage; and P’s action does not present 
significant risks, costs, or burdens to P while the benefits that the other 
3 As Tom Beauchamp writes, “the language of a principle or rule of beneficence refers 
to a normative statement of a moral obligation to act for the others' benefit, helping 
them to further their important and legitimate interests, often by preventing or 
removing possible harms.”
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person can be expected to gain outweigh any burden that P is likely to incur 
(Beauchamp).
Of course, Singer’s Strong Principle opposes this traditional view 
since it suggests that one has a moral obligation to help alleviate 
suffering until one reaches “marginal utility, the point at which, by 
giving more, one would cause oneself and one’s dependents as much 
suffering as one would prevent in [others]” (Singer 234). So the 
Strong Principle suggests a moral obligation to give even when there 
are significant “risks, costs, or burdens to P.” Only once one reaches 
marginal utility, where one’s capacity to assist becomes negligible, 
does one no longer have the moral responsibility to assist. Thus, the 
acceptance of marginal utility as a practical limit to one’s obligation 
to help appears to be the theoretical keystone of the Strong Principle. 
I will reduce this to the question of altruism vis-à-vis egoism: if I am 
affluent and have a high standard of living, what could morally oblige 
me to be as highly altruistic as Singer proposes? 
If I were highly altruistic, I would not be significantly influenced by 
how helping others could benefit me. I would choose to help peo-
ple based on how much they needed help rather than how much I 
desired to help them—I would help impartially. Indeed, self-interest 
would be an insignificant consideration in establishing the morality 
of my actions (Kraut). This could perhaps lead me to break social 
expectations of decency. For example, if I were highly altruistic (and 
informed), I probably would not choose to buy gifts for my other 
affluent friends—which would lose me social capital and be difficult 
emotionally—because that money could be used to help people who 
severely suffer.4 
More absurdly, if I were to come across a hungry homeless person in 
the street, I might choose not to give him a couple dollars’ worth of 
4 As a sidenote, a common empirically-dependent response to extreme altruism is 
that the suffering can and ought to help themselves. Though some use this claim to 
argue against altruism altogether, most use it to argue against a moral obligation to 
be extremely altruistic. However, in a recent literature review entitled “What Makes 
Charity Effective?” I presented convincing evidence that people who severely suffer 
cannot be expected help themselves to escape from such suffering. 
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food, which would make me feel callous and have other consequenc-
es, because I would know that my money, with the appropriate elec-
tronic fund transfer, could help a person almost dead from starvation 
half a world away. 
In one classic defense of impartiality in moral decision-making, Ben-
tham, Mill, Kant, and Sidgwick argue that “when we think morally 
about what to do, reason takes a god’s-eye perspective and sets aside 
the emotional bias we normally have in our own favor, or in favor of 
our circle of friends or our community” (Kraut). 
While this view could defend the Strong Principle, I do not find it 
especially compelling because while it captures why one ought to help 
others, it does not directly respond to my question: “Why should I, 
given my natural self-interest, help others?” Kraut expounds: “It is as 
though we forget about locating ourselves as this particular person; 
we abstract away from our normal self-centered perspective and seek 
the solution to a practical problem that anyone similarly impartial 
would also arrive at.” How could anyone reasonably be expected to 
act morally, if this were the case?
In another classic defense of impartiality, Hume, Schopenhauer, and 
Smith argue:
It holds that there is something extraordinarily valuable in the sentimental 
bonds that take hold among human beings—a feature of human life that is 
overlooked or distorted when morality is understood solely or primarily in 
impersonal terms and from a god’s-eye point of view. In favorable condi-
tions, we naturally and emotionally respond to the weal and woe of others; 
we do not and should not look for reasons to do so (Kraut).
This stance, however, condones the ignoring of reason by moral 
agents. Therefore, importantly, it does not fit Gert’s definition of 
morality as a normative system that is both knowable by and rational 
to follow for all to whom it applies. 
I offer a position somewhat between the two presented above, and my 
conclusions promote the same morality as the Strong Principle: “if it 
is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without 
5
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thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we 
ought, morally, to do it.” My argument is in short that individuals 
must reason from their innate emotions to a morality that encourages 
essentially pure altruism (D’Agostino).5 I postulate that we as human 
beings are fundamentally distinct persons, not simply part of a larger 
social organism that has a duty of self-preservation.6 I also posit that 
morally right actions do good for an entity that holds significant 
intrinsic value (e.g. a person). These predicating assumptions serve 
to clarify what I mean when I refer to “other people” and their moral 
status. I assume that, in the vast majority of cases, others experience 
severe suffering in extremely negative ways “similar” to how I would 
experience such suffering myself. Secondly, I assume that a person’s 
subjective experiences have significant immanent value for that per-
son. Thirdly, I assume my subjective experiences to be valuable in and 
of themselves; restated, my subjective experiences hold objective value.7 
Combining assumptions one and two, I conclude that the immanent 
negative value of my own severe suffering would be extremely sig-
nificant for me. Combining assumptions two and three, I conclude 
that, objectively, each person’s subjective experiences have significant 
immanent value. Now I will make an empirical claim: with a given 
amount of assistance, the extremely negative subjective experiences of 
the severely suffering can be improved incomparably more than my 
significant, yet not as extremely negative or positive, subjective expe-
riences. Combining conclusions one, two, and the empirical claim, 
I finally conclude that, morally, since I ought to take actions that do 
good for what holds significant value, as a relatively affluent person 
I have an obligation to help those who suffer severely to the point of 
marginal utility.
My argument does not rely directly on a bird’s-eye-view of morality, 
or irrationally following one’s emotions, or most tenets of consequen-
5 Here, I answer “[t]he justificatory problem...of satisfactorily answering the 
question ‘why be moral?’” My approach “is reductionist in a pretty straightforward 
sense: it derives moral reasons from non-moral ones.” 
6 I wish to differentiate myself from the view, espoused by David O. Brink and T.H. 
Green, that “individual human beings are mere fragments of a larger social whole.” 
7 For more on immanent (intrinsic) value, see Zimmerman.
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tialism. Instead, it reasons from widely accepted premises to support 
the first conclusion (that one’s capacity is proportionate to one’s obli-
gation), the second conclusion (that distance is unimportant), and the 
third conclusion (that one’s obligation persists whether or not others 
also have that obligation) in Singer’s Strong Principle. Though I will 
more rigorously defend my argument in later work, it offers, even 
now, a more explicit justification for Singer’s Strong Principle than he 
provides himself. Our duty is indeed to perform actions of extreme 
altruism; that is, those of us who are relatively affluent ought to assist 
those who suffer from terrible, yet preventable, disease and poverty 
until we are near their level of suffering, too.
Epilogue
An abstract position like the one I’ve taken in this paper can be so 
counterintuitive that it seems highly implausible even if it has no 
glaring philosophical flaws. To better understand such an argument, 
philosophers often consider it with less abstraction by representing 
it with one or more thought experiments. A complex philosophical 
argument can be evaluated through multiple linked thought experi-
ments. With ethical thought experiments, I find it helpful to consider 
myself as one of the actors and to narrate the experiments in the first 
person; this method respects the intuitive fact that moral decisions 
often feel personal. Below, I put forward a narrative of interrelated 
thought experiments that, I hope, makes Singer’s Strong Principle 
more intuitively acceptable. 
Out of nothingness, I was called into being, a floating man, in a dark 
sky high above the Earth. There was no wind, my limbs were splayed, 
and my body was so calm that I could not even perceive my own 
breathing or heartbeat. I had no physical experience; I discovered a 
great joy in being free from the pains or pleasures of experience. Still, 
I was somehow aware of my own existence; it seemed that my “self ” 
arose out of my consciousness, unprovoked. In this moment of real-
ization, however, I felt the air that buoyed me up suddenly give way, 
and I plummeted down from the heavens.8 
8 This thought experiment is adapted from Avicenna’s 9th-century thought experi-
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I plunged into ocean depths and opened my eyes. They burned with 
salt as my body was gripped by cold. Water rushed into my nose; a 
chill shivered up my spine. I writhed my way upwards and, when I 
surfaced, I coughed out water between gasps for air. Across the starlit 
waters, I glimpsed land nearby. I made my way toward it. During 
this swim, I reminisced about the peace I had felt as a floating man; 
this peacefulness had been upended by my plunge. Despite this, I 
did not feel my sense of self fade as my physical experiences intensi-
fied—it merely found new forms of expression (in the consideration 
of my surroundings). Lost in these reflections, I did not notice the 
water turn brackish, and was thoroughly surprised when I reached 
the banks of an estuary. I stood, waded ashore, and began to walk 
upstream.
At dawn, I perceived a building in the distance. As I got nearer, I saw 
that the building was a medical clinic. I decided to enter and inquire 
as to where I might be, but, before I reached the door, it swung open 
and a doctor sprung out to greet me. “You must be tired from trav-
eling,” she said; she then sat me down and fetched me a muffin and 
a glass of water. There were five half-dead patients in the clinic, and 
they all stared at me with gaunt faces and ghostly eyes. They seemed 
intrigued by me. 
When the doctor returned with my water, I asked her if she could 
save the patients’ lives. She responded: “Each is in need of an organ 
transplant; one needs lungs, one intestines, one a liver, one a pancre-
as, and one a heart.” Then she watched me with expectation, as if I 
would suggest what to do next. But I sat mute. Surprised, she contin-
ued: “You ought to know that I will do what’s right.” 
I stared at her timorously; she leaned toward me and grabbed me by 
the arm. Reacting to the unexpected strength in her grasp, I leapt to 
my feet and asked her what she was playing at. She simply stared at 
me and said, in measured tones, “You must sacrifice yourself! As the 
Good Book says, ‘We, as human beings, are part of a social organism; 
the social self establishes what is moral, in that right actions do good 
ment of “The Floating Man.” 
8
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for the social self.’ My five patients, who are respected leaders in their 
respective communities, will fully recover after their transplants. You 
can exchange your one life for five others. Your family will not suffer 
from worry that you were murdered; they will think that you died on 
a pleasurable adventure through the wilderness. When you sacrifice 
yourself, you will do a great good.” 
All five patients nodded. Though they were in desperate need and the 
doctor’s argument appeared sound, I still could not convince myself 
intuitively that I ought to sacrifice myself to save those patients. So I 
protested to the doctor, and to the patients, that I had a moral sta-
tus as a conscious being which protected me from the obligation to 
sacrifice my own life. When I saw their looks of disgust, despair and 
rage, I realized that they might murder me (without my consent), so I 
turned, fled the clinic, and ran into the bush.
After I had hiked far enough to make my escape, I came upon a beau-
tiful glade. I looked to the sky above and was overcome with the same 
joy in existence that I had experienced up there: “There is value just 
in being, and morality must respect being; all humans, in their being, 
have this intrinsic value, which gives each of us profound moral sta-
tus,” I reflected. As I reached the end of this thought and dropped my 
gaze earthward, I was surprised by a sharp cry. As I reflexively turned 
toward the noise, I saw a small boy crawl out from behind a nearby 
rock, grab a handful of grass, and eat the grass—all while cautiously 
watching me. He looked to be nearly dead from starvation. 
I imagined how he must feel, and I saw that my opportunity to help 
him applied to my recent reflections: “It would be very morally bad 
to allow this being, who holds such great intrinsic value, to suffer,” I 
told myself. I ran over to him, and he told me quietly that he would 
quite like some apples to eat from the tree above, but he didn’t have 
the strength to climb it. Without delay, I clambered far up into the 
branches to reach the fruit, then dropped several apples to the ground 
for him. 
When I climbed down and walked over to him, I saw that, though 
9
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he was famished, he ate the apples very slowly. As he ate, I naively 
told the boy that, since I had come into existence a short time ago, I 
was ignorant of his society. He did not find this peculiar; rather, he 
reached a hand toward me, grabbed my own, and drew me over to sit 
down next to him. He then recounted for me a history of the world, 
as he knew it—a narrative which lasted into the hours of darkness. 
Afterwards, he fell asleep beneath the apple tree; I could not sleep, so 
I gazed at the stars and thought of what questions I would ask the boy 
in the morning. 
At dawn, I fetched for us more apples for breakfast. When I saw that 
the boy’s appetite was sated, I asked him if he knew of many other 
people who severely suffered as he did. He answered, “In my society, 
very many, perhaps one in five.” I then asked about the four out of 
five people who did not suffer so. What did they do for the suffering? 
He replied, “Those people give people like me apples, but only out 
of generosity. Sometimes they give money to organizations, called 
charities, that feed us.” I asked him if he considered me to be one of 
these people, and he answered perceptively, “It cannot be so. For you 
did not give me those apples out of generosity.” 
I told him that he was right, that I felt obliged to help him and not 
generous in doing so. Furthermore, until the time came when I would 
snap out of existence like I had snapped into it, I would consider my 
greatest obligation to be to aid anyone who suffered severely. I would 
help as many as I could, even people I would never meet, because 
they each must have intrinsic value—in their own existence and ex-
periences—similar to my own; I would help until to help would lead 
me to severely suffer or risk death.
Extreme altruism is intuitive if one, as a relatively affluent person, 
knows people who severely suffer. Without personal connections, 
though, our intuition tells us that we are not obligated to help those 
we do not know. If actions consistent with extreme altruism are not 
intuitive, does that mean that they ask too much of moral agents? If 
we learn that our intuitions are misguided, should we still let them 
decide our moral actions?
10
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